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What Really Matters in Auction Design
Open accessAbstract
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auctiona hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European “third-generation” (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not “one size fits all.”
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Klemperer, P. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.491563 · Cited by 773
Self-citationAuctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial
Stoneham, G., Chaudhri, V., Ha, A., & Strappazzon, L. (2003) · Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8489.2003.t01-1-00224.x · Cited by 486
A capability theory of the firm: an economics and (Strategic) management perspective
Teece, D. J. (2019) · New Zealand Economic Papers · doi:10.1080/00779954.2017.1371208 · Cited by 426
How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions
Klemperer, P. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00218-5 · Cited by 361
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Metadata
- Authors
- Klemperer, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2002-02-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 169-189
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1486678498
- Cited by
- 977
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 110.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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