The DOI matches its Crossref record; 93 of the 93 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices
Abstract
Do human resource management (HRM) practices, such as incentive pay, teamwork, training, and careful screening practices, raise productivity, and if so, under what conditions does productivity rise? Recently, this question has been a central focus in organizational and personnel economics. We emphasize the value of a new research approach – an approach we label “insider econometrics”–that is aimed going deep inside businesses to obtain data and insights into the ways in which HRM practices affect specific production processes. We conclude that sets of complementary HRM practices appear to raise performance, but that some firms, such as those that make complex products or those that are starting up brand new facilities, benefit more from these practices.
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Beyond computation: Information technology, organizational transformation and business performance
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Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
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Autor, D. H., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. J. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552801 · Cited by 6,205
Syverson, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.2.326 · Cited by 2,942
Three-Way Complementarities: Performance Pay, Human Resource Analytics, and Information Technology
Aral, S., Brynjolfsson, E., & Wu, L. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1460 · Cited by 365
Nagin, D. S., Rebitzer, J. B., Sanders, S., & Taylor, L. J. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344498 · Cited by 365
The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ichniowski, C., & Shaw, K.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-02-01
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 155-180
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2163138873
- Cited by
- 420
- References
- 93
- FWCI
- 42.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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