The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment
Abstract
Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are “rational cheaters,” who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the “rational cheater model” by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the “rational cheater model” predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer.
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Cites
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Cited by
Does Working from Home Work? Evidence from a Chinese Experiment *
Bloom, N., Liang, J., Roberts, J., & Ying, Z. J. (2015) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju032 · Cited by 1,991
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.556 · Cited by 739
Ichniowski, C., & Shaw, K. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164994 · Cited by 420
Witte, K. D., & Geys, B. (2011) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2010.12.002 · Cited by 132
Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, R., Non, A., & Roelfsema, H. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.001 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Nagin, D. S., Rebitzer, J. B., Sanders, S., & Taylor, L. J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2002-08-01
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 850-873
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125047309
- Cited by
- 365
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 29.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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