The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Case for Antitrust Enforcement
Open accessAbstract
This paper provides evidence of the necessity and success of antitrust enforcement. It begins with examples of socially beneficial antitrust challenges by the federal antitrust agencies to price-fixing and other forms of collusion; to mergers that appear likely to harm competition; and to monopolists that use anticompetitive exclusionary practices to obtain or maintain their market power. It then reviews systematic empirical evidence on the value of antitrust derived from informal experiments involving the behavior of U.S. firms during periods without effective antitrust enforcement, and the behavior of firms across different national antitrust regimes. Overall, it concludes, the benefits of antitrust enforcement to consumers and social welfare -- particularly in deterring the harms from anticompetitive conduct across the economy -- appear to be far larger than what the government spends on antitrust enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on antitrust compliance.
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Cites
The Competitive Advantage of Nations
Clark, T., & Porter, M. W. (1991) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1251962 · Cited by 17,449
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
The Competitive Advantage of Nations
Porter, M. E. (1990) · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-11336-1 · Cited by 15,654
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft
TULLOCK, G. (1967) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x · Cited by 2,963
New York University Law Review
Rawls, J. (2017) · Justice · doi:10.4324/9781315193496-11 · Cited by 2,872
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
Geroski, P. A. (1995) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(95)00498-x · Cited by 1,966
Stigler, G. J. (1964) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258853 · Cited by 1,760
Cited by
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.3 · Cited by 1,566
Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment
Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2013) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00304 · Cited by 316
HECHT, S. B. (2012) · Environmental Conservation · doi:10.1017/s0376892911000452 · Cited by 118
The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool
Ashenfelter, O. C., Hosken, D. S., & Weinberg, M. C. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.5.1.239 · Cited by 111
REVIEW OF TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATION AND POLICY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS USA AND AFRICA
Ezeigweneme, C. A., Umoh, A. A., Ilojianya, V. I., & Adegbite, A. O. (2024) · Computer Science & IT Research Journal · doi:10.51594/csitrj.v5i1.703 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Baker, J. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-11-01
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 27-50
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125160965
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 22.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
