The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Case for Antitrust Enforcement
Open accessAbstract
This paper provides evidence of the necessity and success of antitrust enforcement. It begins with examples of socially beneficial antitrust challenges by the federal antitrust agencies to price-fixing and other forms of collusion; to mergers that appear likely to harm competition; and to monopolists that use anticompetitive exclusionary practices to obtain or maintain their market power. It then reviews systematic empirical evidence on the value of antitrust derived from informal experiments involving the behavior of U.S. firms during periods without effective antitrust enforcement, and the behavior of firms across different national antitrust regimes. Overall, it concludes, the benefits of antitrust enforcement to consumers and social welfare -- particularly in deterring the harms from anticompetitive conduct across the economy -- appear to be far larger than what the government spends on antitrust enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on antitrust compliance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Competitive Advantage of Nations
Clark, T., & Porter, M. W. (1991) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1251962 · Cited by 17,449
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
The Competitive Advantage of Nations
Porter, M. E. (1990) · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-11336-1 · Cited by 15,654
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft
TULLOCK, G. (1967) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x · Cited by 2,963
New York University Law Review
Rawls, J. (2017) · Justice · doi:10.4324/9781315193496-11 · Cited by 2,872
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
Geroski, P. A. (1995) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(95)00498-x · Cited by 1,966
Stigler, G. J. (1964) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258853 · Cited by 1,760
(1970) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1970.tb01072.x · Cited by 1,506
Economics of regulation and antitrust
Viscusi, W. K., Vernon, J. M., & Harrington, J. E. (1992) · Cited by 1,453
The gifts of Athena: historical origins of the knowledge economy
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-4732 · Cited by 1,365
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation
Posner, R. A. (1975) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_2 · Cited by 1,303
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02005-4 · Cited by 1,271
The free-market innovation machine: analyzing the growth miracle of capitalism
(2002) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-0406 · Cited by 1,195
(1999) · Cited by 1,020
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
Tullock, G. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_2 · Cited by 908
On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits
Fisher, F. M., & McGowan, J. J. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 768
Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry
Nevo, A. (2000) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2600994 · Cited by 744
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
Harberger, A. C. (1995) · Essential Readings in Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-24002-9_5 · Cited by 670
How the West Grew Rich: The economic transformation of the industrial world
(1988) · Journal of Macroeconomics · doi:10.1016/0164-0704(88)90019-5 · Cited by 598
Parente, S. L., & Prescott, E. C. (2000) · Cited by 547
A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886
Porter, R. H. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003634 · Cited by 431
A study of cartel stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886
Porter, R. H. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.024 · Cited by 424
The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904
Lamoreaux, N. R. (1985) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511665042 · Cited by 387
Salop, S. C. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 376
Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556080 · Cited by 356
The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly.
Holmes, T. J. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 329
On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions
Merges, R. P., & Nelson, R. R. (1994) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90083-3 · Cited by 324
Introduction to Industrial Organization
Cabral, L. (2000) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 309
Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry
Peters, C. (2006) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/505369 · Cited by 299
Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case
Genesove, D., & Mullin, W. P. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.379 · Cited by 265
Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets
Borenstein, S. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555565 · Cited by 253
The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-Differentiated Industries
Baker, J. B., & Bresnahan, T. F. (1985) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2098385 · Cited by 217
Self-citationTransaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules--A Comment
Calabresi, G. (1968) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466644 · Cited by 217
Efficiency in Manufacturing and the Need for Global Competition
Baily, M. N., Gersbach, H., Scherer, F. M., & Lichtenberg, F. R. (1995) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics · doi:10.2307/2534776 · Cited by 200
N onlinear P ricing and O ligopoly
Stole, L. A. (1995) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00529.x · Cited by 191
Competition, Regulation, and Efficiency in Service Industries
Baily, M. N., Gordon, R. J., & Bresnahan, T. F. (1993) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Microeconomics · doi:10.2307/2534738 · Cited by 137
An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft
Gilbert, R. J., & Katz, M. L. (2001) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.25 · Cited by 119
Estimating Monopoly Behavior with Competitive Recycling: An Application to Alcoa
Suslow, V. Y. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555719 · Cited by 112
Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know
Whinston, M. D. (2001) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.63 · Cited by 104
Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors
Burns, M. R. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261374 · Cited by 98
Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre‐World War I Bromine Industry
Levenstein, M. C. (1997) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00039 · Cited by 93
Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples
Baker, J. B. (1999) · Journal of Public Policy & Marketing · doi:10.1177/074391569901800103 · Cited by 62
Self-citationCorporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration
Brand, D. R. (1988) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 46
Policy-induced competition: the telecommunications experiments
Faulhaber, G. R. (2003) · Information Economics and Policy · doi:10.1016/s0167-6245(02)00087-2 · Cited by 29
Public choice theory and antitrust policy
Shughart, W. F., & McChesney, F. S. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9552-6 · Cited by 28
Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium
Lee, I. K. (1999) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1023/a:1007705126893 · Cited by 25
Competition and Long–run Productivity Growth in the UK and US Tobacco Industries, 1879–1939
Zitzewitz, E. W. (2003) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00189 · Cited by 24
Cited by
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.3 · Cited by 1,566
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1639809 · Cited by 381
Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment
Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G., & Vitale, C. (2013) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00304 · Cited by 316
HECHT, S. B. (2012) · Environmental Conservation · doi:10.1017/s0376892911000452 · Cited by 118
The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool
Ashenfelter, O. C., Hosken, D. S., & Weinberg, M. C. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.5.1.239 · Cited by 111
Metadata
- Authors
- Baker, J. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-11-01
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 27-50
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125160965
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 22.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.