The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case
Abstract
Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and determine whether cheating had occurred. In contrast to established theories, cheating did occur, but sparked only limited retaliation, partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents. (JEL L13, L41)
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Cited by
The dynamics of trade and competition
Chen, N., Imbs, J., & Scott, A. (2009) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.10.003 · Cited by 358
The resource-based view and economics
Lockett, A., & Thompson, S. (2001) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/s0149-2063(01)00121-0 · Cited by 336
Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments
Fonseca, M. A., & Normann, H.-T. (2012) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.002 · Cited by 290
The Case for Antitrust Enforcement
Baker, J. B. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003772034880 · Cited by 268
The Role of Energy in the Industrial Revolution and Modern Economic Growth
Stern, D. I., & Kander, A. (2012) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/01956574.33.3.5 · Cited by 243
Metadata
- Authors
- Genesove, D., & Mullin, W. P.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-06-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 379-398
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121741933
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 8.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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