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Cited by 385

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 59 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship

Open access
Hamman, John R, Loewenstein, George, Weber, Roberto A·2010·American Economic Review

Abstract

Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents. (JEL D82)

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Metadata

Authors
Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, R. A.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2010-09-01
Volume
100
Issue
4
Pages
1826-1846
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1978143506
Cited by
385
References
59
FWCI
42.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.100.4.1826
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Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, R. A. (2010). Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1826

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.