Cited by 3,357Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesNonprofit Sector and VolunteeringEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

Bénabou, Roland, Tirole, Jean·2006·American Economic Review

Abstract

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, more generally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

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Crossref · 10.1257/aer.96.5.1652

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93 of 93 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Consideration of both reputation and others' approval may prevent neural effects from translating into explicit changes in behavior.

    “Although oxytocin significantly reduces amygdala representations of social values, consideration of both reputation 44 and others' approval 45 may prevent neural effects from translating into explicit changes in behavior.”

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Authors
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J.
Affiliations
  • Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CA)
  • Institut d'Economie Industrielle, 21 Allées de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France, Groupe de Recherche en Économic Mathématique et Quantitative, Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socioéconomique, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2006-11-01
Volume
96
Issue
5
Pages
1652-1678
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3125145917
Cited by
3,357
References
93
Citations by year
2026: 214 · 2025: 222 · 2024: 217 · 2023: 209 · 2022: 212 · 2021: 228 · 2020: 208 · 2019: 215 · 2018: 203 · 2017: 199 · 2016: 154 · 2015: 186 · 2014: 190 · 2013: 156 · 2012: 119
FWCI
179.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Keywords
prosocial behavior, altruism, greed, social reputation, self-respect, overjustification effect, extrinsic rewards, crowding out, social norms, stigma, honor, incentive design, social welfare (welfare economics)

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