The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors
Open accessAbstract
Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction web page. This defines a precise contract -- to deliver the car shown for the closing price -- which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. I test this theory using data from eBay Motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants, and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices. (JEL D44, D82, L81)
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Price, quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment
Jin, G. Z., & Kato, A. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00067.x · Cited by 326
Cited by
Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Edelman, B. G., Luca, M., & Svirsky, D. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2701902 · Cited by 999
Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding
Agrawal, A., Catalini, C., & Goldfarb, A. (2014) · Innovation Policy and the Economy · doi:10.1086/674021 · Cited by 845
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Einav, L., Farronato, C., & Levin, J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334 · Cited by 553
Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
Bolton, G., Greiner, B., & Ockenfels, A. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609 · Cited by 429
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-06-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1535-1546
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2157565524
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 15.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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