The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors
Open accessAbstract
Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction web page. This defines a precise contract -- to deliver the car shown for the closing price -- which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. I test this theory using data from eBay Motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants, and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices. (JEL D44, D82, L81)
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Citations
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Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment
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Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.Com
Luca, M. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1928601 · Cited by 627
Einav, L., Farronato, C., & Levin, J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334 · Cited by 553
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-06-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1535-1546
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2157565524
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 15.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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