The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks
Open accessAbstract
In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G21, L15, L25)
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Strategic information transmission
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Rost, B. (2010) · Handbook of Transnational Economic Governance Regimes · doi:10.1163/ej.9789004163300.i-1081.238 · Cited by 1,590
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
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Log-concave probability and its applications
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Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure
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Log-concave probability and its applications
Bagnoli, M., & Bergstrom, T. (2006) · Studies in Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/3-540-29578-x_11 · Cited by 963
On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design
Johnson, J. P., & Myatt, D. P. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.3.756 · Cited by 631
Cited by
GENNAIOLI, N., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. (2015) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12188 · Cited by 537
Household Finance: An Emerging Field
Guiso, L., & Sodini, P. (2013) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/b978-0-44-459406-8.00021-4 · Cited by 437
Gomes, F., Haliassos, M., & Ramadorai, T. (2021) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20201461 · Cited by 396
Inderst, R., & Ottaviani, M. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.883 · Cited by 385
Self-citationRating agencies in the face of regulation
Opp, C. C., Opp, M. M., & Harris, M. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.011 · Cited by 382
Metadata
- Authors
- Inderst, R., & Ottaviani, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2012-04-01
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 780-809
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2030653824
- Cited by
- 322
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 53.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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