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Cited by 322

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks

Open access
Inderst, Roman, Ottaviani, Marco·2012·American Economic Review

Abstract

In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G21, L15, L25)

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Metadata

Authors
Inderst, R., & Ottaviani, M.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2012-04-01
Volume
102
Issue
2
Pages
780-809
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2030653824
Cited by
322
References
24
FWCI
53.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.102.2.780
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Inderst, R., & Ottaviani, M. (2012). Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.780

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.