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Cited by 974

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure

Open access
Hart, Oliver, Tirole, Jean, Carlton, Dennis W., Williamson, Oliver E.·1990·Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics

Abstract

In addition, we shall see that exclusive dealing, even if it is feasible, is not generally a perfect substitute for integration.In particular, if U 's supply costs are finite rather than infinite, then it is no longer optimal for an integrated U -D^pair not to supply D at all.Instead U -D will want to offer D the same amount that U would offer D , but at a slightly lower price (see Section 3) .An exclusive dealing contract will not achieve this.Moreover, a contract that limits the amount that U can sell D" may be very difficult to enforce: given that U is supplying D anyway, it may be hard for D. to verify that supplies equal 100, say, rather than 200.Integration avoids this problem: profit-sharing between U.. and D means that U automatically finds it in its interest to supply the profit-maximizing level (and quality of service) to D.. In extensions of this first variant,, we consider the possibility that it is not known in advance whether U or U is the more efficient supplier, and that the upstream and downstream firms must make ex-ante industry-specific investments prior to trading ex-post.We show that the more efficient (in a stochastic sense) upstream firm will have a greater incentive to merge to monopolize the market ex-post.Also, if U -D merge, D"'s profits will typically fall since if U turns out to be the more efficient firm ex-post, U will channel supplies towards D at the expense of D-. This fall in D 's profits may cause it to stop investing (or exit the industry).To the extent that exit by D. reduces U" ' s profit by lowering the total demand for its product, U" may have an incentive to rescue D by An analysis of exclusive dealing contracts is contained in Appendix 3.The enforcement problem becomes even greater if I' vjants to commit itself not to supply D with quality of service above U 's.

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Metadata

Authors
Hart, O., Tirole, J., Carlton, D. W., & Williamson, O. E.
Venue
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1990
Volume
1990
Pages
205
ISSN
1057-8641 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2046585608
Cited by
974
References
18
FWCI
25.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2534783
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Hart, O., Tirole, J., Carlton, D. W., & Williamson, O. E. (1990). Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2534783

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