The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Revolving Door Lobbyists
Open accessAbstract
Washington's “revolving door”––the movement from government service into the lobbying industry––is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
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Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances: building relational capital
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Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Fisman, R. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.1095 · Cited by 2,968
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
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Cited by
Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2013) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfs039 · Cited by 920
The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Kermani, A., Kwak, J., & Mitton, T. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.10.001 · Cited by 615
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308 · Cited by 367
Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying
Hill, M. D., Kelly, G. W., Lockhart, G. B., & Van Ness, R. A. (2013) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12032 · Cited by 266
Grose, C. R., Lopez, P., Sadhwani, S., & Yoshinaka, A. (2022) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/714923 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanes i Vidal, J., Draca, M., & Fons-Rosen, C.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2012-12-01
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3731-3748
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W2111036739
- Cited by
- 639
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 12.74
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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