Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts
Open accessAbstract
This article analyzes whether political connections of the board of directors of publicly traded companies in the USA affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with boards connected to the winning (losing) party experience a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement contracts after the election. The results remain significant after controlling for industry classifications as well as for several other company characteristics. The findings highlight one of the main avenues through which corporate political connections add value to US companies.
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- Authors
- Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J.
- Affiliations
- Korea University (KR)
- Venue
- Review of Finance
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-01-10
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1617-1648
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-692X
- 1572-3097
- OpenAlex
- W3122199437
- Cited by
- 920
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 69 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 98 · 2023: 95 · 2022: 85 · 2021: 79 · 2020: 87 · 2019: 68 · 2018: 53 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 48 · 2015: 39 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 127.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- European Finance Review (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Keywords
- political connections, board of directors, government procurement contracts, contract allocation, congressional elections, listed companies, corporate political connections
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