The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Revolving Door Lobbyists
Open accessAbstract
Washington's “revolving door”––the movement from government service into the lobbying industry––is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Blanes i Vidal, J., Draca, M., & Fons-Rosen, C.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2012-12-01
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3731-3748
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W2111036739
- Cited by
- 639
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 12.74
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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