The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets
Abstract
Hiring inexperienced workers generates information about their abilities. If this information is public, workers obtain its benefits. If workers cannot compensate firms for hiring them, firms will hire too few inexperienced workers. I determine the effects of hiring workers and revealing more information about their abilities through a field experiment in an online marketplace. I hired 952 randomly-selected workers, giving them either detailed or coarse public evaluations. Both hiring workers and providing more detailed evaluations substantially improved workers' subsequent employment outcomes. Under plausible assumptions, the experiment's market-level benefits exceeded its cost, suggesting that some experimental workers had been inefficiently unemployed. (JEL J23, J24, M51)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(1964) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 5,128
Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets
Acemoğlu, D., & Pischke, J. (1999) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00405 · Cited by 1,392
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555531 · Cited by 992
Gibbons, R., & Katz, L. F. (1991) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298273 · Cited by 819
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5605 · Cited by 755
Farber, H. S., & Gibbons, R. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946706 · Cited by 711
Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages
Weiss, A. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260884 · Cited by 637
Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination
Altonji, J., & Pierret, C. (1997) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6279 · Cited by 598
Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency
Waldman, M. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555679 · Cited by 518
Adverse Selection in the Labor Market
Greenwald, B. C. N. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429023507 · Cited by 441
Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
Greenwald, B. C. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297632 · Cited by 357
Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?
Autor, D. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7637 · Cited by 319
Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?
Autor, D. H. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301753265615 · Cited by 282
Bloom, H. S., Orr, L. L., Bell, S. H., Cave, G., Doolittle, F., Lin, W., & Bos, J. M. (1997) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/146183 · Cited by 256
Autor, D. H., & Houseman, S. N. (2010) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.2.3.96 · Cited by 226
Landing the First Job: The Value of Intermediaries in Online Hiring
Stanton, C. T., & Thomas, C. (2016) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv042 · Cited by 195
Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle
Dickens, W. T., Katz, L. F., Lang, K., & Summers, L. H. (1989) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298211 · Cited by 177
New Evidence on the Long-Term Effects of Employment Training Programs
Couch, K. A. (1992) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298292 · Cited by 138
Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of Talent 1
Terviö, M. (2009) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00522.x · Cited by 135
The National Supported Work Demonstration.
Brown, C. V., & Hollister, R. G. (1985) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233273 · Cited by 120
Redcross, C., Bloom, D., Azurdia, G., Zweig, J. M., & Pindus, N. M. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 62
Bell, S. H., & Orr, L. L. (1994) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/146055 · Cited by 54
Transitional Jobs: Background, Program Models, and Evaluation Evidence.
Bloom, D. (2010) · Cited by 35
Ineffiient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor MarketsPreprint
Pallais, A. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2012131 · Cited by 21
Self-citation
Cited by
Introduction—Platforms and Infrastructures in the Digital Age
Constantinides, P., Henfridsson, O., & Parker, G. G. (2018) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2018.0794 · Cited by 943
A first look at online reputation on Airbnb, where every stay is above average
Zervas, G., Proserpio, D., & Byers, J. W. (2021) · Marketing Letters · doi:10.1007/s11002-020-09546-4 · Cited by 600
Crépon, B., Duflo, E., Gurgand, M., Rathelot, R., & Zamora, P. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt001 · Cited by 558
Einav, L., Farronato, C., & Levin, J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334 · Cited by 553
Kuhn, K. M., & Maleki, A. (2017) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2015.0111 · Cited by 430
Metadata
- Authors
- Pallais, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2014-11-01
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 3565-3599
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124347181
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 67.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.