The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment
Abstract
Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across cars that are vertically ranked by quality. This implies that information disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality, causing both good and bad news to increase competition and revenues. The data confirm these hypotheses. These findings have implications for the design of other markets, including e-commerce, procurement auctions, and labor markets. (JEL C93, D44, D82, L15)
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Claims other papers make about this one
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Information disclosure helps in matching heterogeneous buyers to sellers of varying quality.
“Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) shows that information disclosure helps in matching heterogeneous buyers to sellers of varying quality.”
From Two-Sided Adverse Selection and Bilateral Reviews in Sharing Economy (2019) · cites this paper as Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015)
Citations
Cites
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
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Research works printed but not linked: 16
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00131.x · DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4 · DOI
- 10.1111/joie.12048 · DOI
- 10.2307/1251005 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.07.003 · DOI
- 10.1086/261891 · DOI
- 10.2307/1073080 · DOI
- 10.1086/466995 · DOI
- 10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00018-0 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1162/003355303321675428 · DOI
- 10.1257/aer.96.3.756 · DOI
- 10.1257/aer.101.4.1535 · DOI
- 10.2307/3003562 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.2307/1911865 · DOI
- 10.1287/mnsc.1090.0998 · DOI
- 10.2307/2951695 · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Two-Sided Adverse Selection and Bilateral Reviews in Sharing Economy
Tunc, M. M., Cavusoglu, H., & Raghunathan, S. (2019) · SSRN · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3499979 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Tadelis, S., & Zettelmeyer, F.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2015-02-01
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 886-905
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118997265
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 6
- FWCI
- 12.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Keywords
- information disclosure, matching mechanisms, consumer heterogeneity, product quality, competition, auction revenue, market design, e-commerce, labor market, procurement auctions
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