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Two-Sided Adverse Selection and Bilateral Reviews in Sharing Economy

Open access
Tunc, Murat M, Cavusoglu, Huseyin, Raghunathan, Srinivasan · 2019 · SSRN

Abstract

We examine two-sided adverse selection in a sharing economy context where a platform matches service providers with consumers and both providers and consumers derive heterogeneous payoffs depending on whom they are matched with. Unlike the more prevalent unilateral review scheme in which only consumers rate providers, many sharing economy platforms use a bilateral review scheme in which both consumers and providers rate each other to reduce the information asymmetry on both sides of the market and to facilitate superior matches. However, we show that the bilateral review scheme does not necessarily lead to a higher social welfare than either the unilateral review scheme or the no review scheme. If the proportion of the low-cost consumers is less than a threshold, consumers are better off, the platform is worse off, and the providers are worse off under the bilateral review scheme than the unilateral review scheme. The key driver for these results is that the price competition between providers for the low-cost consumers can be fundamentally different under the different review schemes; the price competition affects the consumer preference for a provider and hence the match between consumers and providers, which ultimately determines the payoffs to participants and the social welfare. Our results highlight the importance of addressing the consumer-side adverse selection first to eliminate a market failure even in the sharing economy context. Our findings also contribute to the adverse selection literature by identifying the critical role played by demand and supply conditions on the impact of adverse selection.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper develops a game-theoretic model of a peer-to-peer sharing platform with two-sided adverse selection and compares no reviews, unilateral reviews, and bilateral reviews. It finds that bilateral reviews intensify provider price competition, lower platform profit, can raise provider profit when low-cost consumers are sufficiently numerous, and do not always improve social welfare relative to unilateral reviews or no reviews.

Key findings

  • Bilateral reviews intensify price competition because providers lower prices to attract low-cost consumers; consequently, the platform’s revenue is lower under bilateral reviews than under unilateral reviews (Proposition 3). In low demand the platform profit is the same under both schemes, but in high demand unilateral reviews always yield higher platform profit.
  • Providers’ total profit is higher under bilateral reviews than under unilateral reviews when the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently high: \(\pi^{BR*} > \pi^{UR*}\) if and only if \(\gamma^* < \gamma \le 1\), where \(\gamma^*\) is a threshold formula given in the paper. Otherwise, providers are worse off under bilateral reviews.
  • Social welfare is greater under unilateral reviews than under no reviews (Proposition 1). However, bilateral reviews yield lower social welfare than unilateral reviews when the proportion of high-quality providers is sufficiently high, \(q_H/(q_H+q_L) < \rho\), and the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently low, \(\gamma < \frac{M(1-\rho)(q_H-q_L)}{q_H(N_H-M\rho)-q_L M(1-\rho)}\) (Proposition 2). Figure 3 also indicates bilateral reviews can hurt social welfare even relative to no reviews when both \(\rho\) and \(\gamma\) are small.
  • Consumer surplus is greater under bilateral reviews than under unilateral reviews (Proposition 5), because providers lower prices to compete for low-cost consumers.

Methods

  • Analytical game-theoretic model of an online peer-to-peer platform that matches \(M\) competing providers with \(N\) consumers. Providers choose prices and pay the platform a commission \(\alpha\); provider quality is \(q_j \in \{q_H,q_L\}\), consumer cost type is \(\theta_i \in \{\theta_H,\theta_L\}\), and provider \(j\)’s cost to serve consumer \(i\) is \(c_{i,j} = \theta_i q_j\).
  • The model compares three information regimes: no review, unilateral review (provider types revealed), and bilateral review (both provider and consumer types revealed). It derives equilibrium prices, provider profits, platform profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare under high-demand and low-demand scenarios.
  • Social welfare is calculated as expected service quality minus expected cost to serve; prices cancel out in the welfare calculation. Proofs and equilibrium derivations are provided in the appendix.

Limitations

  • The paper states several limitations and future extensions: the platform’s matching algorithm is assumed to maximize social welfare rather than its own profit; ratings are assumed to reveal provider quality and consumer type perfectly; providers are assumed to charge one price, whereas in practice they may charge multiple prices such as cleaning fees or refundable deposits; competing platforms with different review schemes and endogenous provider quality choices are left for future work.
  • The model assumes the proportions of low-cost consumers and high-quality providers are common knowledge for analytical tractability, and it considers only two demand scenarios (high and low), excluding other possible demand configurations for brevity.
  • The text makes evident that the analysis abstracts away from search frictions, review manipulation, and the platform’s information-disclosure policy, focusing instead on the impact of the bilateral review scheme itself.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.3499979

Cites

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Statistics

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Figures

Figure 1 Uber (a sharing economy platform for transportation services) uses a bilateral rating scheme where a star rating for drivers (on the left) and a star rating for riders (on the right) are given after each transaction.
Figure 1 Uber (a sharing economy platform for transportation services) uses a bilateral rating scheme where a star rating for drivers (on the left) and a star rating for riders (on the right) are given after each transaction.From the PDF
Image 2
From the PDF
Figure 3 Social welfare comparison of all three review schemes.
Figure 3 Social welfare comparison of all three review schemes.From the PDF
Image 4
From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Akerlof, G. A. 1978. 'The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,' in Uncertainty in Economics, Elsevier, pp. 235-251.
  2. Jin, C., Hosanagar, K., and Veeraraghavan, S. 2017. 'Impact of Bilateral Rating System on Online to Offline Platforms,' in 28th Workshop on Information Systems and Economics (WISE 2017), Seoul, South Korea,

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Metadata

Authors
Tunc, M. M., Cavusoglu, H., & Raghunathan, S.
Affiliations
  • Tilburg University (NL)
  • The University of Texas at Dallas (US)
Corresponding author
Tunc, Murat M
Venue
SSRN
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2989697314
Cited by
5
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2020: 3
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
  • Journal of the Association for Information Systems (submittedVersion)
  • International Conference on Information Systems
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Sharing Economy and Platforms
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
sharing economy platforms, information asymmetry, social welfare (welfare economics), price competition, market failure

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Two-Sided Adverse Selection and Bilateral Reviews in Sharing Economy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2139/ssrn.3499979
The paper
Tunc, M. M., Cavusoglu, H., & Raghunathan, S. (2019). Two-Sided Adverse Selection and Bilateral Reviews in Sharing Economy. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3499979

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