The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Robustness and Linear Contracts
Abstract
We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal demands robustness, evaluating possible contracts by their worst-case performance, over unknown actions the agent might potentially take. The model assumes risk-neutrality and limited liability, and no other functional form assumptions. Very generally, the optimal contract is linear. The model thus offers a new explanation for linear contracts in practice. It also introduces a flexible modeling approach for moral hazard under nonquantifiable uncertainty. (JEL D81, D82, D86)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Rational choice and the structure of the environment.
Simon, H. A. (1956) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0042769 · Cited by 5,919
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261826 · Cited by 1,873
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261392 · Cited by 1,206
Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.
Feltham, G. A., & Xie, J. (1994) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9412141436 · Cited by 901
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. E. (2005) · World Scientific series in economic theory · doi:10.1142/9789814374590_0002 · Cited by 603
Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts
Bhattacharyya, S., & Lafontaine, F. (1995) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556017 · Cited by 537
Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
Chung, K., & Ely, J. C. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00427.x · Cited by 194
Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand
Segal, I. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322156963 · Cited by 192
Calibrated Incentive Contracts
Chassang, S. (2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta9987 · Cited by 116
Managerial incentives: on the Near Linearity of Optimal Compensation
Diamond, P. A. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250036 · Cited by 102
Chu, L. Y., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.1.419 · Cited by 89
New Perspectives on Statistical Decisions Under Ambiguity
Stoye, J. (2012) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110959 · Cited by 29
Sellers with Misspecified Models
Madarász, K., & Prat, A. (2016) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdw030 · Cited by 23
Robust trading mechanisms to strategic uncertainty
Yamashita, T. (2013) · Cited by 3
Cited by
Inherent Tradeoffs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores
(2023) · The Societal Impacts of Algorithmic Decision-Making · doi:10.1145/3603195.3603197 · Cited by 310
Algorithmic monoculture and social welfare
(2023) · The Societal Impacts of Algorithmic Decision-Making · doi:10.1145/3603195.3603202
Metadata
- Authors
- Carroll, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2015-02-01
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 536-563
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2017310792
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 32.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.