The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Banks as Secret Keepers
Open accessAbstract
Banks produce short-term debt for transactions and storing value. The value of this debt must not vary over time so agents can easily trade it at par like money. To produce money-like safe liquidity, banks keep detailed information about their loans secret, reducing liquidity if needed to prevent agents from producing costly private information about the banks' loans. Capital markets involve information revelation, so they produce risky liquidity. The trade-off between less safe liquidity and more risky liquidity determines which firms choose to fund projects through banks and which ones through capital markets. (JEL D92, E51, G21, G31, G32)
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?
Vallée, B., & Zeng, Y. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy100 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Dang, T. V., Gorton, G., Holmström, B., & Ordoñez, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2017-04-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1005-1029
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122771827
- Cited by
- 365
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 42.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.