The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Open accessAbstract
We develop an agency model explaining why third‐party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful. While third‐party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees, collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion. We embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development, showing that the tax take evolves as an S‐shape driven by changes in third‐party information. We show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development.
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Cites
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Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
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Cited by
Naritomi, J. (2019) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160658 · Cited by 353
The effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement: Evidence from a natural experiment in China
Chen, S. X. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.01.001 · Cited by 299
Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries
Hanna, R., & Olken, B. A. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.4.201 · Cited by 299
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement
Carrillo, P., Pomeranz, D., & Singhal, M. (2017) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20140495 · Cited by 280
Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. A. (2016) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjv042 · Cited by 267
Metadata
- Authors
- Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E.
- Venue
- Economica
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-03-08
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 330
- Pages
- 219-246
- ISSN
- 0013-0427 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0335
- OpenAlex
- W2145249185
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 67
- FWCI
- 40.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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