The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper provides a simple, yet robust framework to evaluate the time profile of benefits paid during an unemployment spell. We derive sufficient-statistics formulae capturing the marginal insurance value and incentive costs of unemployment benefits paid at different times during a spell. Our approach allows us to revisit separate arguments for inclining or declining profiles put forward in the theoretical literature and to identify welfare-improving changes in the benefit profile that account for all relevant arguments jointly. For the empirical implementation, we use administrative data on unemployment, linked to data on consumption, income, and wealth in Sweden. First, we exploit duration-dependent kinks in the replacement rate and find that, if anything, the moral hazard cost of benefits is larger when paid earlier in the spell. Second, we find that the drop in consumption affecting the insurance value of benefits is large from the start of the spell, but further increases throughout the spell. In trading off insurance and incentives, our analysis suggests that the flat benefit profile in Sweden has been too generous overall. However, both from the insurance and the incentives side, we find no evidence to support the introduction of a declining tilt in the profile. (JEL D82, E21, E24, J64, J65)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test,
McCrary, J. (2008) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005 · Cited by 3,600
Unemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells
Meyer, B. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2546 · Cited by 1,270
The European Unemployment Dilemma
Ljungqvist, L., & Sargent, T. J. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250020 · Cited by 1,001
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Chetty, R. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/588585 · Cited by 853
Consumption versus Expenditure
Aguiar, M., & Hurst, E. (2005) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/491590 · Cited by 749
Duration Dependence and Labor Market Conditions: Evidence from a Field Experiment*
Kroft, K., Lange, F., & Notowidigdo, M. J. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt015 · Cited by 711
Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice
Cohen, A., & Einav, L. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 · Cited by 708
Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers Revisited
Couch, K. A., & Placzek, D. W. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.572 · Cited by 676
Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods
Chetty, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142910 · Cited by 666
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hopenhayn, H. A., & Nicolini, J. P. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262078 · Cited by 588
Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance
Baily, M. N. (1978) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(78)90053-1 · Cited by 561
Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences
Chetty, R., & Szeidl, A. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.2.831 · Cited by 488
A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance
Chetty, R. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.01.004 · Cited by 361
Coles, M., & Smith, E. (1998) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527239 · Cited by 333
Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance
Krueger, A., & Meyer, B. (2002) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9014 · Cited by 300
Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the Duration of Unemployment
Lockwood, B. (1991) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297830 · Cited by 289
Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession
Rothstein, J. (2011) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.1353/eca.2011.0018 · Cited by 283
Schmieder, J. F., von Wachter, T., & Bender, S. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs010 · Cited by 276
Inference on Causal Effects in a Generalized Regression Kink Design
Card, D., Lee, D. S., Pei, Z., & Weber, A. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11224 · Cited by 269
Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times
Michaillat, P. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.4.1721 · Cited by 236
UNEMPLOYED BUT OPTIMISTIC: OPTIMAL INSURANCE DESIGN WITH BIASED BELIEFS
Spinnewijn, J. (2015) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12099 · Cited by 232
Self-citationEmpirical labor search: A survey
Eckstein, Z., & van den Berg, G. J. (2007) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.11.006 · Cited by 221
Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed
Shimer, R., & Werning, I. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.1922 · Cited by 205
The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New Evidence and Interpretation
Schmieder, J. F., & von Wachter, T. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115758 · Cited by 174
Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design
Landais, C. (2015) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20130248 · Cited by 170
Self-citationReservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance
Shimer, R., & Werning, I. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.3.1145 · Cited by 158
Job Search and Savings: Wealth Effects and Duration Dependence
Lentz, R., & Tranæs, T. (2005) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/430284 · Cited by 149
Imputing consumption from income and wealth information
Browning, M., & Leth‐Petersen, S. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00135 · Cited by 119
Public Policy in a Model of Long-term Unemployment
Acemoğlu, D. (1995) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554901 · Cited by 114
OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, WITH HUMAN CAPITAL DEPRECIATION, AND DURATION DEPENDENCE*
Pavoni, N. (2009) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00532.x · Cited by 109
Johnston, A. C., & Mas, A. (2016) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w22411 · Cited by 61
Koijen, R. S. J., Nieuwerburgh, S. V., & Vestman, R. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2006423 · Cited by 51
Household consumption: Research questions, measurement issues, and data collection strategies
Pistaferri, L. (2015) · Journal of Economic and Social Measurement · doi:10.3233/jem-150401 · Cited by 49
A Permutation Test and Estimation Alternatives for the Regression Kink DesignPreprint
Ganong, P., & Jäger, S. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2462714 · Cited by 31
Cited by
Consumer Spending during Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications
Ganong, P., & Noel, P. (2019) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20170537 · Cited by 433
Metadata
- Authors
- Kolsrud, J., Landais, C., Nilsson, P., & Spinnewijn, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2018-04-01
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 4-5
- Pages
- 985-1033
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2200172062
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 27.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.