The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates
Abstract
This paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the Federal Reserve and the public by examining Federal Reserve and commercial inflation forecasts. It demonstrates that the Federal Reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters. It also shows that monetary-policy actions provide signals of the Federal Reserve's information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals. These findings may explain why long-term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy. (JEL E52, E43, D82)
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Cites
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Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information
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Why Are Professional Forecasters Biased? Agency versus Behavioral Explanations
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Macroeconomics Forecasts and Microeconomic Forecasters
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Does the federal reserve possess an exploitable informational advantage?
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Cited by
What explains the stock market’s reaction to federal reserve policy?
BERNANKE, B. S., & KUTTNER, K. N. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00760.x · Cited by 2,384
Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B., & Swanson, E. T. (2004) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.2004.66 · Cited by 1,560
Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity
Gertler, M., & Karadi, P. (2015) · American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.20130329 · Cited by 1,455
High-Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-Neutrality: The Information Effect*
Nakamura, E., & Steinsson, J. (2018) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy004 · Cited by 1,405
Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Blinder, A. S., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., De Haan, J., & Jansen, D.-J. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.4.910 · Cited by 1,383
Metadata
- Authors
- Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2000-06-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 429-457
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1977168372
- Cited by
- 1,047
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 48.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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