Does Money Illusion Matter?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper shows that a small amount of individual-level money illusion may cause considerable aggregate nominal inertia after a negative nominal shock. In addition, our results indicate that negative and positive nominal shocks have asymmetric effects because of money illusion. While nominal inertia is quite substantial and long lasting after a negative shock, it is rather small after a positive shock. (JEL C92, E32, E52)
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Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Tyran, J.-R.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-12-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1239-1262
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121810673
- Cited by
- 416
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 31.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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