The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Guilt in Games
Abstract
The paper proposes to ways to capture guilt in the contexts of strategic interaction. We refer to the theoretical framework of dynamic psychological games, presented in another paper of us. Simple guilt is a dislike for letting the other down; guilt from blame is a dislike for the other's terminal belief that one has let him down. We provide conditions for equivalence of these two notions of guilt, showing by example that they are tight. We also show that every materially efficient outcome can be supported as an equilibrium if players are sufficiently sensitive to guilt. We stress the importance of players' ex post information partition.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
Journal of Economic Literature
(2019) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.109.633 · Cited by 7,468
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Guilt: An interpersonal approach
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243 · Cited by 1,884 · cited 1×
“(4) i(s ijh) = lim k!1 Pr c(sc) Q j 6=i Pr j (sj) P s0 i2S i(h) Pr c(s 0 c) Q j 6=i Pr j (s 0 j) ;”
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
Self-citationCharness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x · Cited by 1,491
Self-citationBernheim, B. D. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261957 · Cited by 1,304
Elster, J. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,166
Psychological games and sequential rationality
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5 · Cited by 1,017
11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
Kuhn, H. W. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-012 · Cited by 913
Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings
Caplin, A., & Leahy, J. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556347 · Cited by 808
Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004 · Cited by 535
Self-citationMeasuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0715 · Cited by 453
Self-citationRecent Advances in the Empirical Study of Shame and Guilt
TANGNEY, J. P. (1995) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/0002764295038008008 · Cited by 419
The framing of games and the psychology of play
Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003 · Cited by 408
Self-citationShifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility
Bartling, B., & Fischbacher, U. (2012) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdr023 · Cited by 384
Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences
Lazear, E. P., Malmendier, U., & Weber, R. A. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.1.136 · Cited by 362
The Supply of Information by a Concerned Expert
Caplin, A., & Leahy, J. V. (2004) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.0013-0133.2004.0228a.x · Cited by 162
The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study
Bacharach, M., Guerra, G. A., & Zizzo, D. J. (2007) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-007-9043-5 · Cited by 154
Trust responsiveness and beliefs
Guerra, G. A., & Zizzo, D. J. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.003 · Cited by 136
Marital investments, time consistency and emotions
Dufwenberg, M. A. (2002) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00225-6 · Cited by 126
Self-citationTesting theories of reciprocity: Do motivations matter?
Stanca, L., Bruni, L., & Corazzini, L. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.009 · Cited by 124
More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures
Huang, P. H., & Wu, H.-M. (1994) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036856 · Cited by 112
Schnedler, W., & Vadovič, R. (2011) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00315.x · Cited by 90
Dufwenberg, M. A., & Lundholm, M. (2001) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00648 · Cited by 56
Self-citationPromises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements
Miettinen, T. (2013) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.002 · Cited by 39
Guilt and shame: an axiomatic analysis
López‐Pérez, R. (2009) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-009-9132-8 · Cited by 25
Cited by
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z · Cited by 1,194
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12006 · Cited by 995
Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004 · Cited by 535
Self-citationNormative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434
The framing of games and the psychology of play
Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003 · Cited by 408
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-04-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 170-176
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2004752197
- Cited by
- 675
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 29.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.