The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Promises and Partnership
Abstract
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.
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Citations
Cites
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Self-citationAre people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences
(1977) · doi:10.1016/c2013-0-10517-x · Cited by 2,457
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Elster, J. (1989) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.99 · Cited by 2,071
Cited by
Mas, A., & Moretti, E. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.112 · Cited by 1,280
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052187 · Cited by 1,184
Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10637 · Cited by 371
Civic honesty around the globe
Cohn, A., Maréchal, M. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Zünd, C. L. (2019) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aau8712 · Cited by 322
Damgaard, M. T., & Nielsen, H. S. (2018) · Economics of Education Review · doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.03.008 · Cited by 321
Metadata
- Authors
- Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2006-11
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1579-1601
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W3123273141
- Cited by
- 1,491
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 132.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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