The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain
Abstract
When a job-seeker and an employer meet, find a prospective joint surplus, and bargain over the wage, conditions in the outside labor market, including especially unemployment, may have limited influence. The job-seeker's only credible threat during bargaining is to hold out for a better deal. The employer's threat is to delay bargaining. Consequently, the outcome of the bargain depends on the relative costs of delays to the parties, rather than on the payoffs that result from exiting negotiations. Modeling bargaining in this way makes wages less responsive to unemployment. A stochastic model of the labor market with credible bargaining and reasonable parameter values yields larger employment fluctuations than does the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. (JEL J22, J23, J31, J64)
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Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
Mortensen, D. T., & Pissarides, C. A. (1994) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297896 · Cited by 3,840
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
Shimer, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828572 · Cited by 2,731
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555382 · Cited by 2,511
Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function
Petrongolo, B., & Pissarides, C. A. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.390 · Cited by 2,384
Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness
Hall, R. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828482 · Cited by 1,439 · cited 4×
“Hall (2005a) estimates a value of 0.77 based on the large movements of the vacancy/unemployment ratio and the job-finding rate in the U.S. recession of 2001, using data from the new vacancy and turnover survey that began in 2000.”
InfluentialSelf-citationRubinstein, A., & Osborne, M. J. (1990) · Cited by 1,270
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited
Hagedorn, M., & Manovskii, I. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.4.1692 · Cited by 1,046
The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7562 · Cited by 792
Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games
Mortensen, D. T. (1982) · American Economic Review · Cited by 534
More on unemployment and vacancy fluctuations
Mortensen, D. T., & Nagypál, É. (2007) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/j.red.2007.01.004 · Cited by 405
LABOR TURNOVER COSTS AND THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF VACANCIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Silva, J. I., & Toledo, M. (2009) · Macroeconomic Dynamics · doi:10.1017/s1365100509080122 · Cited by 306
Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance
Krueger, A., & Meyer, B. (2002) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9014 · Cited by 300
Job Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment in the U.S. Economy over the Past Fifty Years
Hall, R. E. (2005) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.1086/ma.20.3585415 · Cited by 293
Self-citationUnemployment Insurance Takeup Rates and the After-Tax Value of Benefits
Anderson, P. M., & Meyer, B. D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555389 · Cited by 267
Employment Efficiency and Sticky Wages: Evidence from Flows in the Labor Market
Hall, R. E. (2005) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/0034653054638346 · Cited by 193
Self-citationA Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money
Coles, M., & Wright, R. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2353 · Cited by 81
An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination
Rosén, Å. (1997) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(96)00024-4 · Cited by 66
Cited by
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
Shimer, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828572 · Cited by 2,731
Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness
Hall, R. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828482 · Cited by 1,439
Self-citationThe Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited
Hagedorn, M., & Manovskii, I. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.4.1692 · Cited by 1,046
Uncertainty shocks are aggregate demand shocks
Leduc, S., & Liu, Z. (2016) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.07.002 · Cited by 828
The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7562 · Cited by 792
Metadata
- Authors
- Hall, R. E., & Milgrom, P. R.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-08-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1653-1674
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2032830535
- Cited by
- 750
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 98.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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