Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile
Abstract
Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)
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Effective vote markets thrive under open or semi-open voting because this allows the buyer of a vote to verify that the seller kept his part of the bargain.
“E¤ective vote markets thrive under open or semi-open voting because this allows the buyer of a vote to verify that the seller kept his part of the bargain and their e¤ectiveness is enhanced through social control and resort to e¤ective economic sanctions if promises are not kept (Baland and Robinson, 2008).”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Baland and Robinson, 2008
The effectiveness of vote markets is enhanced through social control and resort to effective economic sanctions if promises are not kept.
“E¤ective vote markets thrive under open or semi-open voting because this allows the buyer of a vote to verify that the seller kept his part of the bargain and their e¤ectiveness is enhanced through social control and resort to e¤ective economic sanctions if promises are not kept (Baland and Robinson, 2008).”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Baland and Robinson, 2008
In some Latin American countries, the secret ballot was effective at reducing electoral corruption; in Chile in 1958 it broke pervasive patron-client relationships.
“and, in some countries, the secret ballot was e¤ective at weeding out electoral corruption.Baland and Robinson (2008), for example, demonstrate how the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 broke pervasive patron-client relationships.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Baland and Robinson (2008)
The available quantitative evidence on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of studies of particular markets and none of these consider the role of modernization.
“The available quantitative evidence on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of insightful studies of particular markets and none of these consider the role of modernization.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Baland and Robinson (2008)
Chile adopted the secret ballot in 1958.
“We date the de facto secret ballot to 1958.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Baland and Robinson (2008)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution
Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V. (2014) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000124 · Cited by 242 · see citing works
From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization
Aidt, T. S., & Jensen, P. S. (2012) · Faculty of Economics · doi:10.17863/cam.1045 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
- Authors
- Baland, J.-M., & Robinson, J. A.
- Affiliations
- University of Namur (BE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-11-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1737-1765
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099303373
- Cited by
- 307
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 35 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 46.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Digital Access to Libraries (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Politics and Society in Latin America
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Dynamics in Latin America
- Keywords
- secret ballot, voting behavior, clientelism, land rent, right-wing parties, electoral reform, political behavior, land and power, Chile
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