The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines
Abstract
Context can influence decisions. This malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings. In a market equilibrium, however, context conveys payoff-relevant information to consumers. Consequently, these consumers rationally violate naïve formulations of standard choice theoretic principles. I identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors, namely the compromise effect and choice overload, arise as market equilibria. Firms respond to consumers' contextual inference; in case of the compromise effect, a firm may introduce premium loss leaders (expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods). (JEL D11, D83, M31)
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Cites
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The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting
Laibson, D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555253 · Cited by 6,122
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When choice is demotivating: can one desire too much of a good thing?
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Cited by
Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting
Laibson, D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555253 · Cited by 6,122
Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior
Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. H. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.81 · Cited by 930
On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games
List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/519249 · Cited by 918
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. I. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.728545 · Cited by 441
The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use Social Comparisons
Allcott, H., & Kessler, J. B. (2019) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20170328 · Cited by 386
Metadata
- Authors
- Kamenica, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-11-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2127-2149
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2033676662
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 6.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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