Why Don't Present-Biased Agents Make Commitments?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Present-biased preferences engender a demand for commitment. Commitment is a problematic prediction, since we see so little of it. I quantitatively explore the reasons for the “missing” commitment. Extending the procrastination model in Carroll et al. (2009), I show how equilibrium commitment is related to (i) the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time, (ii) the cost of delay, (iii) the degree of partial naivete, and (iv) the direct cost of commitment. The calibrated model demonstrates that the perceived benefits of commitment are often overwhelmed by the costs of commitment. Demand for commitment is a special case rather than the general case.
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Cites
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Cited by
Cohen, J., Ericson, K. M., Laibson, D., & White, J. M. (2020) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20191074 · Cited by 344
Self-citationBeyond Willpower: Strategies for Reducing Failures of Self-Control
Duckworth, A. L., Milkman, K. L., & Laibson, D. (2018) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100618821893 · Cited by 257
Self-citationAlcohol and Self-Control: A Field Experiment in India
Schilbach, F. (2019) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20170458 · Cited by 206
“On the one hand, underestimating the extent of their self-control problems due to partial or full näıveté as in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) may lower the demand for (costly) commitment by decreasing the perceived benefits of commitment (Laibson 2015).”
BackgroundBehavioral development economics
Kremer, M., Rao, G., & Schilbach, F. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.12.002 · Cited by 188
Ericson, K. M., & Laibson, D. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.12.001 · Cited by 125
Self-citationProcrastination in the Field: Evidence from Tax Filing
Martinez, S.-K., Meier, S., & Sprenger, C. (2023) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvac067 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Laibson, D.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2015-05-01
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 267-272
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1858398342
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 6.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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