Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature
Abstract
We review economics research regarding the effect of police, punishments, and work on crime, with a particular focus on papers from the last twenty years. Evidence in favor of deterrence effects is mixed. While there is considerable evidence that crime is responsive to police and to the existence of attractive legitimate labor-market opportunities, there is far less evidence that crime responds to the severity of criminal sanctions. We discuss fruitful directions for future work and implications for public policy. (JEL J64, K42)
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Empirical evidence for the prediction that longer sentences discourage criminal behavior is weak.
“One prediction of the economic approach to crime and punishment is that longer sentences should discourage criminal behavior. Empirical evidence for this prediction is weak, however (Chalfin & McCrary, 2017).”
From Stories in Action. (2022) · cites this paper as Chalfin & McCrary, 2017
Cites
HOT SPOTS OF PREDATORY CRIME: ROUTINE ACTIVITIES AND THE CRIMINOLOGY OF PLACE*
SHERMAN, L. W., GARTIN, P. R., & BUERGER, M. E. (1989) · Criminology · doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb00862.x · Cited by 2,104 · see citing works
General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime “hot spots”: A randomized, controlled trial
Sherman, L. W., & Weisburd, D. (1995) · Justice Quarterly · doi:10.1080/07418829500096221 · Cited by 1,029 · see citing works
BRAGA, A. A., KENNEDY, D. M., WARING, E. J., & PIEHL, A. M. (2001) · Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency · doi:10.1177/0022427801038003001 · Cited by 589 · see citing works
PROBLEM‐ORIENTED POLICING IN VIOLENT CRIME PLACES: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT*
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WEISBURD, D., WYCKOFF, L. A., READY, J., ECK, J. E., HINKLE, J. C., & GAJEWSKI, F. (2006) · Criminology · doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2006.00057.x · Cited by 533 · see citing works
Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence
Matsueda, R. L., Kreager, D. A., & Huizinga, D. (2006) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240607100105 · Cited by 467 · see citing works
The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime
Braga, A. A. (2001) · The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/000271620157800107 · Cited by 390 · see citing works
Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal Deterrence
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The Effects of “Pulling Levers” Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime
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Policing the homeless: An evaluation of efforts to reduce homeless‐related crime
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Incarceration, Recidivism, and Employment
Bhuller, M., Dahl, G. B., Løken, K. V., & Mogstad, M. (2020) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/705330 · Cited by 335 · see citing works
Walsh, J., Vaida, N., Coman, A., & Fiske, S. T. (2022) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/15291006231161337 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
“Empirical evidence for this prediction is weak, however (Chalfin & McCrary, 2017).”
Background
- Authors
- Chalfin, A., & McCrary, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- ORCID
- Chalfin, Aaron
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2017-03-01
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-48
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2594084844
- Cited by
- 727
- References
- 10
- Citations by year
- 2026: 78 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 68 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 98 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 91 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 45 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 8 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 111.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Literature (publishedVersion)
- bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime Patterns and Interventions
- Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Justice and Penology
- Keywords
- crime deterrence, crime, police, punishment, criminal sanctions, labor market opportunities, criminal policy
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