The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information and the Coase Theorem
Open accessAbstract
Some economists think the Coase theorem implies a lot about the proper scope of government intervention in the economy and about the welfare consequences of laissez-faire. Others see it as a mere tautology: that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be efficient. The Coase theorem is important only if we believe that efficient negotiation is likely. Of course we can attribute inefficiencies to “bargaining imperfection,” but it may not be useful to do so. Such attitudes sometimes seem to depend more on ideology than on reason. This article gives one economist's reasoned view. It discusses the Coase Theorem as a decentralization result and why decentralization results are interesting. It considers mechanism design for revealing private information, and describes the problems of centralization. Should the Coase theorem should be viewed as a second-best result—property rights are more efficient than some reasonable alternative? Does the Coase theorem recommend an institution or make institutions unnecessary?
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Dugger, W. M. (1987) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1987.11504638 · Cited by 14,786
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
The Use of Knowledge in Society
HAYEK, F. (1996) · Knowledge Management and Organisational Design · doi:10.1016/b978-0-7506-9749-1.50005-3 · Cited by 6,434
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Ysander, B.-C., & Arrow, K. J. (1975) · The Swedish Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3438925 · Cited by 2,600
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Sdol, E. (2009) · Cited by 1,396
Monopoly with Incomplete Information
Maskin, E., & Riley, J. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555674 · Cited by 1,140
Cited by
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10481 · Cited by 3,101
Two-sided markets: A progress report
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x · Cited by 2,994
Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136363 · Cited by 1,455
Acquisti, A., Taylor, C., & Wagman, L. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.54.2.442 · Cited by 1,283
Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey
Aidt, T. S. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00171.x · Cited by 1,192
Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility
Kitzmueller, M., & Shimshack, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.1.51 · Cited by 1,116
Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2009) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.07.002 · Cited by 785
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
Acemoglu, D. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.003 · Cited by 666
The company of strangers: a natural history of economic life
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1685 · Cited by 534
A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation
Moravcsik, A. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899550887 · Cited by 517
Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
Barrett, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199286094.001.0001 · Cited by 373
RETHINKING MACROECONOMICS: WHAT FAILED, AND HOW TO REPAIR IT
Stiglitz, J. E. (2011) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01030.x · Cited by 342
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview
Roth, A. E. (1988) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233717 · Cited by 336
Stiglitz, J. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.2.3 · Cited by 324
Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?
Baland, J.-M., & Platteau, J.-P. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198290616.001.0001 · Cited by 277
The New Institutional Economics and its applicability to development
Nabli, M. K., & Nugent, J. B. (1989) · World Development · doi:10.1016/0305-750x(89)90076-4 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1987-11-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 113-129
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2094634882
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 16.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.