Cited by 2,994Digital Platforms and EconomicsMerger and Competition AnalysisGame Theory and Voting Systems

Two-sided markets: A progress report

Rochet, Jean-Charles, Tirole, Jean·2006·The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

We provide a roadmap to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and present new results. We identify two-sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms, matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two-sidedness. We build a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtain new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x

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47 of 47 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Digital platforms function as two-sided marketplaces that facilitate relationships between users who want to purchase or rent a good and actors able to fulfill that demand by selling or lending through the platform.

    “Essentially, they function as two-sided marketplaces that facilitate the relationship between users who want to purchase (or rent) a good and actors able to fulfill that demand by selling or lending that good through the platform (Rochet & Tirole, 2006).”

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Authors
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J.
Affiliations
Université de Toulouse (FR)
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2006-09
Volume
37
Issue
3
Pages
645-667
ISSN
  • 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
  • 1756-2171
OpenAlex
W2129998937
Cited by
2,994
References
47
Citations by year
2026: 125 · 2025: 159 · 2024: 155 · 2023: 204 · 2022: 214 · 2021: 187 · 2020: 230 · 2019: 206 · 2018: 218 · 2017: 138 · 2016: 140 · 2015: 142 · 2014: 138 · 2013: 132 · 2012: 128
FWCI
247.58
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
two-sided markets, platform pricing, Coase theorem, membership fees, user fees, bargaining, price setting

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