The DOI matches its Crossref record; 150 of the 150 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
Abstract
This book develops a theory of international cooperation on environmental issues. The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including game theory, economics, international law, and international relations. It explains why treaties are used to address these challenges, and what makes treaties succeed or fail. Treaties can only change behavior by restructuring the incentives that drive behavior. Successful treaties must therefore make it in the interests of countries to participate in and to comply with an agreement demanding substantial changes in behavior such as reductions in pollution emissions. The theory is applied to a number of environmental problems including acid rain, protection of the ozone layer, the management of international fisheries, and the regulation of oil dumping at sea. The concluding chapter, updated in the paperback edition with a new afterword, uses the theory to explain why the Kyoto Protocol will fail to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and why alternative approaches may work better.
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Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
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Myers, N., Mittermeier, R. A., Mittermeier, C. G., da Fonseca, G. A. B., & Kent, J. (2000) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35002501 · Cited by 31,710
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
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Cited by
Bättig, M. B., & Bernauer, T. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090092 · Cited by 455
Cooperation and discord in global climate policy
Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2016) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate2937 · Cited by 401
The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering
Barrett, S. (2008) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-007-9174-8 · Cited by 358
Self-citationSequencing to ratchet up climate policy stringency
Pahle, M., Burtraw, D., Flachsland, C., Kelsey, N., Biber, E., Meckling, J., Edenhofer, O., & Zysman, J. (2018) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0287-6 · Cited by 271
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2005-10-01
- OpenAlex
- W2479914761
- Cited by
- 373
- References
- 150
- FWCI
- 38.60
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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