The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage
Open accessAbstract
The standard economic model of the family is a ‘common preference’ model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose ‘pooling’ and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.
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Self-citation
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When Does Gender Trump Money? Bargaining and Time in Household Work
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Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households *
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1996-11-01
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 139-158
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2161186418
- Cited by
- 1,205
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 46.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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