The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 139 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 90 are not checked yet.
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Open accessAbstract
One of the most persistent cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. In this paper I characterize this contrast more fully, and discuss attempts by economists to reduce normoriented action to some type of optimizing behavior. Social norms, as I understand them here, are emotional and behavioral propensities of individuals. Are norms rationalizations of self-interest? Are norms followed out of self-interest? Do norms exist to promote self-interest? Do norms exist to promote common interests? Do norms exist to promote genetic fitness?
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“Social norms are external, socially defined normative standards that are the most socially appropriate action for a decision-maker in a given set of circumstances [44].”
From A Taxonomy of Social Errors in Human-Robot Interaction (2021) · cites this paper as [44]
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Cites
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Flagged first, then by citations
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Cited by
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Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
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Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Elster, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Elster, Jon
- ORCID
- Elster, Jon
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1989-11-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 99-117
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2081314276
- Cited by
- 2,071
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 84 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 97 · 2021: 96 · 2020: 84 · 2019: 101 · 2018: 102 · 2017: 77 · 2016: 80 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 61 · 2013: 80 · 2012: 81
- FWCI
- 16.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Keywords
- social norms, homo economicus, homo sociologicus, instrumental rationality, normative behavior, self-interest, common interests, genetic fitness, Adam Smith, Émile Durkheim
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