What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

NAFTA produced minute net efficiency gains for the US economy.

“recent research suggests NAFTA produced minute net efficiency gains for the US economy”

• cites Caliendo and Parro (2015) sourceSupported

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

NAFTA increased US welfare by 0.08 percent.

“They conclude that NAFTA increased US”

• cites Caliendo and Parro (2015) sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

In the March 2012 IGM survey, 35 of 37 economists who answered agreed or strongly agreed that freer trade improves productive efficiency and offers consumers better choices, and in the long run these gains are much larger than any effects on employment; two were uncertain and none disagreed.

“Of the 37 economists who answered, 35 picked”

May combine two claims.

In the March 2012 IGM survey, the NAFTA question produced a virtually identical response: no one disagreed, only two economists picked uncertain, with one less vote for strongly agree (10 instead of 11) and one more vote for agree (25 instead of 24).

“The second question on NAFTA produced a virtually identical response.Once again, no one disagreed and only two economists picked”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Countries should want to have free trade regardless of what their trade partners do.

“A direct implication is that countries should want to have free trade regardless of what their trade partners do.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

NAFTA severely depressed wages of those groups and communities most directly affected by Mexican competition.

“while severely depressing wages of those groups and communities most directly affected by Mexican competition?”

• cites Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

The view that trade agreements serve to neutralize protectionist special interests is very widely held.

“Nevertheless, the view that trade agreements serve to neutralize protectionist special interests is very widely held.”

• cites Grossman (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

An optimal international arrangement would trade off the benefits of expanding market integration against the costs of excessive harmonization, but we have only a hazy idea where that optimal point lies, and it will vary across policy domains.

“An optimal international arrangement would trade off the benefits of expanding market integration (by reducing regulatory diversity) against the costs of excessive harmonization.But in general, we have only a hazy idea where that optimal point may lie, which in any case will vary across different policy domains.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The influence of special interests is rarely exercised through the naked application of power; instead, these groups get their way by convincing policymakers and the broader public that certain of their goals also further the public interest.

“The influence of special interests is rarely exercised through the naked application of power-do this, or else! Instead, these groups get their way by convincing policymakers and the broader public that certain of their goals also further the public interest.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

We cannot simply look at whether agreements are trade-creating or not and evaluate them on that basis.

“What is clear is that we cannot simply look at whether agreements are trade-creating or not and evaluate them on that basis.”

May combine two claims.

ISDS provisions enable foreign investors, and they alone, to sue host governments in special arbitration tribunals and to seek monetary damages for regulatory, tax, and other policy changes that reduce their profits.

“They are an anomaly in that they enable foreign investors, and they alone, to sue host governments in special arbitration tribunals and to seek monetary damages for regulatory, tax, and other policy changes that reduce their profits.”

May combine two claims.

Rönnbäck found that the approach pursued by the Swedish government in the trade negotiations was not only in line with special-interest lobbying, but it was largely shaped by it.

“But Rönnbäck found that the approach pursued by the Swedish government in the trade negotiations was not only in line with special-interest lobbying, but it was largely shaped by it.”

• cites Rönnbäck 2015 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Agreements that privilege investors or corporations over other interests (like labor or the environment) can end up producing largely redistributive consequences with few efficiency gains.

“It is similarly easy to see that agreements that privilege investors or corporations over other interests (like labor or the environment) can end up producing largely redistributive consequences with few efficiency gains.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

It is easy to come up with examples where too much regulatory harmonization in the name of reducing transaction costs to trade leaves at least one of the negotiating parties worse off.

“It is all too easy to come up with examples where too much regulatory harmonization in the name of reducing transaction costs to trade leaves at least one of the negotiating parties worse off.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Unlike tariffs and quotas, there is no natural benchmark that allows us to judge whether a regulatory standard is excessive or protectionist.

“For economists, the trouble is that unlike in the case of tariffs and quotas, there is no natural benchmark that allows us to judge whether a regulatory standard is excessive or protectionist.”

May combine two claims.

Actual policymakers negotiating trade agreements are not much concerned about terms of trade; they care more about trade volume and trade market access.

“However, this theory does not sit well with the fact that actual policymakers do not seem very concerned about the terms of trade when they negotiate trade agreements.They tend to care more about the volume of trade: nations like it when their exports grow, but not so much when their imports expand.Effectively, nations trade market access: more of your imports in return for more of my exports.”

May combine two claims.

Large countries have an incentive to exploit their market power through optimal tariffs; a Nash equilibrium of such tariffs would be inefficient, and a trade agreement enforcing free trade could leave all countries better off.

“Countries that are”

• cites Harry Johnson (1953) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

The IMF has officially revised its stance on capital controls and now acknowledges a useful role for them where more direct remedies for underlying macroeconomic and financial imbalances are not available.

“The International Monetary Fund itself, once at the vanguard of the push for capital-account liberalization, has officially revised its stance on capital controls.It now acknowledges a useful role for them where more direct remedies for underlying macroeconomic and financial imbalances are not available.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

From the standpoint of social welfare, tying the hands of future opponents has much less to recommend itself.

“From the standpoint of social welfare, this strategy has much less to recommend itself.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Social welfare is the appropriate standard for evaluating trade agreements.

May combine two claims.

Government practice on the export side boosts export supply through subsidies, credits, and other assistance, lowering export prices and worsening the terms of trade.

“But on the export side, general government practice consists of boosting export supply, through export subsidies, credits, and other assistance, rather than reducing it.This has the effect of lowering export prices on world markets, and hence worsening the terms of trade.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Different national assessments of risk and varying conceptions of business-stakeholder relations will produce different regulatory standards, none obviously superior to others.

“Different national assessments of risk-safety, environmental, health-and varying conceptions of how business should relate to its stakeholders-employees, suppliers, consumers, local communities-will produce different standards, none obviously superior to others.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

In the time-inconsistency framework, trade agreements are a commitment device for governments to withstand political pressure from future protectionists.

“In these settings, trade agreements are a commitment device for governments to withstand political pressure from future protectionists.”

• cites Staiger and Tabellini 1987Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Export subsidies worsen a country's own terms of trade and benefit other nations, so there is no terms-of-trade reason for trade agreements to prohibit them.

“When a government resorts to export subsidies, it worsens its own terms of trade and confers economic benefits on other nations.If it does so nevertheless, it must be for noneconomic or special-interest reasons.Regardless, there would be no reason for trade agreements to prohibit their use.As Grossman (2016) notes,”

• cites Grossman (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).

Trade agreements are shaped largely by rent-seeking, self-interested behavior on the export side.

“In this view, trade agreements are shaped largely by rent-seeking, self-interested behavior on the export side.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Free trade is the optimal policy for an economy, provided compensatory policies can be implemented and adverse interactions with market failures can be addressed through complementary policies.

“Basic trade theory suggests that free trade is the optimal policy for an economy, provided compensatory policies can be implemented and adverse interactions with market failures can be addressed through complementary policies.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Regulatory standards are public goods over which different nations have different preferences.

“In the language of economics, regulatory standards are public goods over which different nations have different preferences.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

With post-1995 trade agreements, matters are no longer so simple.

“With post-1995 trade agreements, matters are no longer so simple.”

May combine two claims.

Capital account liberalization became a norm in trade agreements just as professional opinion among economists was becoming more skeptical about the wisdom of free capital flows.

“Paradoxically, capital account liberalization became a norm in trade agreements just as professional opinion among economists was becoming more skeptical about the wisdom of free capital flows.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

ISDS operates outside accepted legal regimes, gives arbitrators too much power, does not follow or set precedents, and allows no appeal.

“But ISDS also suffers from its own problems: it operates outside accepted legal regimes, gives arbitrators too much power, does not follow or set precedents, and allows no appeal.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

Regulatory harmonization may spur trade, but it could also prevent regulations from reflecting domestic preferences.

“Potential trade-offs arise in all of these areas: regulatory harmonization may spur trade, but it could also prevent regulations from reflecting domestic preferences.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The success of TRIPs had to do in no small part with the framing of the issue in terms that gave it broad legitimacy and appeal.

“The success of TRIPs had to do in no small part with the framing of the issue in terms that gave it broad legitimacy and appeal.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

If trade deals are the outcome of partisan politics, there will be pressure in the future to renege on them once political power changes hands.

“Of course, if trade deals are the outcome of partisan politics, there will be pressure in the future to renege on them, once political power changes hands.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

A large country may be able to manipulate its terms of trade at the expense of its trade partners using an optimal tariff.

“The only exception is that a large country may be able to manipulate its terms of trade at the expense of its trade partners, using an”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Trade policy practitioners justify trade agreements by the politics of trade policy at home: trade agreements enable governments to resist domestic import-competing interests.

“Instead, they tend to justify trade agreements by reference to the politics of trade policy at home: Trade agreements are what enable governments to say”

• cites Bown 2016Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Before the 1980s, when trade agreements were largely about import tariffs and quotas, the export-side rent-seeking scenario may not have been particularly likely; with trade agreements increasingly focusing on domestic rules and regulations, that scenario is more likely.

“When trade agreements were largely about import tariffs and quotas-that is before the 1980s-the second scenario may not have been particularly likely.But with trade agreements increasingly focusing on domestic rules and regulations, we can no longer say the same.”

May combine two claims.

Intellectual property protection has become broader and stronger through subsequent trade agreements, and much of the flexibility afforded to individual countries under the original WTO agreement has been eliminated.

“Thanks to subsequent trade agreements, intellectual property protection has become broader and stronger, and much of the flexibility afforded to individual countries under the original World Trade Organization agreement has been eliminated (Sell 2011).”

• cites Sell 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Economists tend to be nearly unanimous in their view that trade agreements are a good thing despite not knowing much about the details, and they must believe such agreements regularly strike the right balance in areas of ambiguity.

“Regardless, it is curious that economists tend to be nearly unanimous in their view that trade agreements are a good thing.Despite not knowing much about the details, they must believe such agreements regularly strike the right balance in all these areas of ambiguity.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The IGM survey respondents are representative of economists' views on free trade and NAFTA.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

International agreements in new areas produce economic consequences that are far more ambiguous than lowering traditional border barriers, and their welfare and efficiency impacts are fundamentally uncertain.

“International agreements in such new areas produce economic consequences that are far more ambiguous than is the case of lowering traditional border barriers.They may well generate increases in the volume of trade and cross-border investment.Nevertheless their welfare and efficiency impacts are fundamentally uncertain.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

It is not clear that restricting what a future government can do is a win-win outcome.

“The future government may have better or worse ideas about government policy, and it is not clear that restricting what it can do in the future is a win-win outcome.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Erosion of consumer protections in high-standard countries may expand trade, but it will not leave importing countries better off.

“Erosion of consumer protections in high-standard countries may likewise expand trade, but it will not leave importing countries better off.”

May combine two claims.

In TRIPs, advanced countries' gains are largely developing countries' losses; consumers in developing nations pay higher prices for pharmaceuticals and other research-intensive products, and advanced countries' firms reap higher monopoly rents.

“But in TRIPs, the advanced countries' gains are largely the developing countries' losses.Consumers in the developing nations pay higher prices for pharmaceuticals and other research-intensive products and the advanced countries' firms reap higher monopoly rents.”

May combine two claims.

Pharmaceutical companies were able to obtain test data exclusivity, a prohibition on parallel imports, severe restrictions on compulsory licensing, and automatic patent term extensions in subsequent trade agreements.

“Pharmaceutical companies were able to obtain test data exclusivity (preventing generics providers from using the same data in their own licensing applications), a prohibition on parallel imports (of original products, but by other than the patent-holders), severe restrictions on compulsory licensing requirements by host governments, and automatic patent term extensions (Sell 2011).”

• cites Sell 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Real-world trade agreements are difficult to understand from the lens of optimal tariff theory, and as they have evolved beyond import tariffs and quotas into regulatory rules and harmonization, they have become harder to fit into received economic theory.

“Economists have long known that real-world trade agreements are difficult to understand from the lens of”