The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts
Open accessAbstract
A main puzzle in the sovereign debt literature is that defaults have only minor effects on subsequent borrowing costs and access to credit. This paper comes to a different conclusion. We construct the first complete database of investor losses (“haircuts”) in all restructurings with foreign banks and bondholders from 1970 until 2010, covering 180 cases in 68 countries. We then show that restructurings involving higher haircuts are associated with significantly higher subsequent bond yield spreads and longer periods of capital market exclusion. The results cast doubt on the widespread belief that credit markets “forgive and forget.” (JEL E43, F34, G15, H63)
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Cites
Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses
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Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?
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A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt
Bulow, J., & Rogoff, K. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261596 · Cited by 991
Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account
Aguiar, M., & Gopinath, G. (2006) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.05.005 · Cited by 796
The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default
Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.3.651 · Cited by 559
Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access?
Gelos, R. G., Sahay, R., & Sandleris, G. (2011) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.11.007 · Cited by 416
The Costs of Sovereign Default
Borensztein, E., & Panizza, U. (2009) · IMF Staff Papers · doi:10.1057/imfsp.2009.21 · Cited by 362
Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector
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The sovereign ceiling and emerging market corporate bond spreads
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Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit
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Cited by
Systemic Banking Crises Database II
Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2020) · IMF Economic Review · doi:10.1057/s41308-020-00107-3 · Cited by 1,123
The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default
Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.3.651 · Cited by 559
Horn, S., Reinhart, C., & Trebesch, C. (2019) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w26050 · Cited by 323
Self-citationChina as an International Lender of Last Resort
Horn, S., Parks, B., Reinhart, C., & Trebesch, C. (2023) · doi:10.3386/w31105 · Cited by 73
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Cruces, J. J., & Trebesch, C.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2013-07-01
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 85-117
- ISSN
- 1945-7707 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-7715
- OpenAlex
- W1480626585
- Cited by
- 549
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 53.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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