The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyzes the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on firms’ tax compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below the eligibility threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. The response is stronger in sectors where transactions leave more paper trail, suggesting that monitoring effort and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements. We estimate that there would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller businesses. (JEL H25, H26, H32, L25)
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Citations
Cites
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
On the Size Distribution of Business Firms
Lucas, R. E. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003596 · Cited by 3,236
Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?
Saez, E. (2010) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.2.3.180 · Cited by 950
Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax
Feldstein, M. (1999) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465399558391 · Cited by 816
Chetty, R. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.1.2.31 · Cited by 340
Cited by
Tax Compliance and Enforcement
Slemrod, J. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20181437 · Cited by 563
Notching R&D Investment with Corporate Income Tax Cuts in China
Chen, Z., Liu, Z., Suárez Serrato, J. C., & Xu, D. Y. (2021) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20191758 · Cited by 443
WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE?
Alm, J. (2019) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12272 · Cited by 442
de España, B. (2024) · Informe Anual · doi:10.53479/36512 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Almunia, M., & Lopez-Rodriguez, D.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2018-02-01
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-38
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W1931817967
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 29.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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