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The Long-Run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining

Open access
Lovenheim, Michael F., Willén, Alexander · 2019 · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Cited by 57

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We analyze how exposure to teacher collective bargaining affects long-run outcomes for students, exploiting the timing of state duty-to-bargain law passage in a cross-cohort difference-in-difference framework. Among men, exposure to a duty-to-bargain law in the first 10 years after passage depresses annual earnings by $2,134 (3.93 percent), decreases weekly hours worked by 0.42, and reduces employment and labor force participation. The earnings estimate implies that current duty-to-bargain laws reduce earnings by $213.8 billion annually. Effects grow with time since law passage, are largest among nonwhites, and are not evident for women. Duty-to-bargain laws reduce male noncognitive skills, supporting the labor market findings. (JEL I21, J22, J31, J45, J51, J52, K31)

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 30

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Lovenheim, M. F., & Willén, A.
Venue
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Published
2019-08-01
Volume
11
Issue
3
Pages
292-324
ISSN
  • 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
  • 1945-774X
OpenAlex
W3123384386
Cited by
57
References
10
FWCI
10.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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