The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect
Open accessAbstract
Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents—for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this “golden goose” effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter. (JEL D73, D82, H83, J41, K42, O17, O21)
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Citations
Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.259 · Cited by 719
Banerjee, A. V. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555484 · Cited by 587
Cited by
Corruption in Developing Countries
Olken, B., & Pande, R. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17398 · Cited by 470
The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics*
Burgess, R., Hansen, M., Olken, B. A., Potapov, P., & Sieber, S. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs034 · Cited by 466
Labor Market Effects of Social Programs: Evidence from India's Employment Guarantee
Imbert, C., & Papp, J. (2015) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20130401 · Cited by 317
The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics
Burgess, R., Hansen, M., Olken, B., Potapov, P., & Sieber, S. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17417 · Cited by 255
Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
Pierce, L., Snow, D. C., & McAfee, A. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2103 · Cited by 251
Metadata
- Authors
- Niehaus, P., & Sukhtankar, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2013-11-01
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 230-269
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W2005057299
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 56.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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