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Cited by 69Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsNarrative Theory and AnalysisLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking

Open access
Roese, Neal J., Morrison, Mike·2009·GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences
DOI 10.12759/hsr.34.2009.2.16-26
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Abstract

Kontrafaktisches Denken bezeichnet die mentale Konstruktion von Alternativen zu vergangenen Ereignissen. Dieser Artikel soll einen Überblick über die psychologischen Grundlagen kontrafaktischen Denkens gewähren. Die Autoren zeigen wie solche Gedanken bestimmte Emotionen wecken und uns im alltäglichen Leben zum Vorteil gereichen können. Zwei bestimmte psychologische Mechanismen - der contrast und der causal inference effect - erklären viele der von Psychologen beobachteten Effekte kontrafaktischen Denkens. Abschließend zeigen sie, wie und warum kontrafaktische Alternativen sowohl in erklärenden wie auch in fiktionalen Zusammenhängen (z.B. in der alternate history) eindringlich und unterhaltsam sein können.

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Roese, N. J., & Morrison, M.
Affiliations
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
ORCID
Venue
GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences
Publisher
GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences
Published
2009
Volume
34
Issue
2
Pages
16-26
DOI
10.12759/hsr.34.2009.2.16-26
OpenAlex
W1641352344
Cited by
69
References
2
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 4
FWCI
1.62
Type
journal article
Language
de
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Historical social research (cc-by)
  • Historical social research
Funders
National Institute of Mental Health
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Literature and Literary Theory › Narrative Theory and Analysis
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
Keywords
counterfactual reasoning, counterfactual emotions, contrast effects, causal inference, alternative history, fiction, everyday life, psychological mechanisms

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