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Combinatorial and Quantity-Discount Procurement Auctions Benefit Mars, Incorporated and Its Suppliers
Abstract
Simple auctions neglect the complex business constraints required by strategic sourcing. The Mars-IBM team created a procurement auction Web site 〈www.number1traders.com〉 that enables buyers to incorporate complex bid structures (such as bundled all-or-nothing bids and quantity-discounted bids) and business constraints into strategic-sourcing auctions. Outcomes in such auctions must lead to win-win solutions to sustain long-term relationships between procurer and suppliers. These factors are as important or more important than price. The Mars procurement auction Web site supports several alternatives to simple auctions that help match its needs as procurer and the capabilities of suppliers by incorporating optimal bid selection subject to constraints based on business rules in a dynamic environment. The ability to consider geographic, volume, and quality factors helps both parties. Feedback from participant suppliers has highlighted the benefits of time efficiency, transparency, and fairness. Although they reflect just one side of the benefits ledger, the monetary benefits to Mars (a $14 billion company) and to its suppliers are significant.
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Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Kwasnica, A. M., Ledyard, J. O., Porter, D., & DeMartini, C. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334 · Cited by 282
User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms: Role of information feedback
Adomavicius, G., Curley, S. P., Gupta, A., & Sanyal, P. (2013) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2013.07.015 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Hohner, G., Rich, J., Ng, E., Reid, G., Davenport, A. J., Kalagnanam, J. R., Lee, H. S., & An, C.
- Venue
- Interfaces
- Published
- 2003-02
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-35
- ISSN
- 0092-2102 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-551X
- OpenAlex
- W2157767869
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 25.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Combinatorial and Quantity-Discount Procurement Auctions Benefit Mars, Incorporated and Its Suppliers. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/inte.33.1.23.12717
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- Hohner, G., Rich, J., Ng, E., Reid, G., Davenport, A. J., Kalagnanam, J. R., Lee, H. S., & An, C. (2003). Combinatorial and Quantity-Discount Procurement Auctions Benefit Mars, Incorporated and Its Suppliers. Interfaces. https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.33.1.23.12717
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