The Role of User Privacy Concerns in Shaping Competition Among Platforms
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study the effect of user privacy concerns on competition between online advertising platforms. Online platforms attract advertisers by offering capabilities to reach audiences likely to be receptive to their ads in a timely and accurate manner. However, the collection and processing of user information required for targeting of ads may lead to privacy concerns. We model the competition between two platforms as a two-stage game where platforms announce their targeting capabilities in the first stage and advertising fees in the second stage. The presence of heterogeneity in the user and the advertiser populations with respect to their preferences for targeting leads to differentiation between platforms. While one platform offers the minimum level of targeting feasible, the other platform offers a strictly higher level of targeting. The extent of differentiation in targeting levels depends on the intensity of competition between the platforms on the user side. When competition on the user side is relatively low, the extent of differentiation is higher. Such competition for users may decline, when users are less concerned about loss of privacy or when they choose to double home. Higher targeting differentiation allows platforms to charge higher advertising fees and earn higher profits. We also consider the case where platforms can reduce the privacy concerns of users by offering them greater control over their personal information. We demonstrate that awarding user control leads to reduced targeting differentiation between platforms and lower advertising fees. Last, we derive the equilibrium targeting levels for platforms that use a subscription-based business model instead of an advertising-based business model. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2017.0730 .
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Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
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Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799
Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy Controls
Tucker, C. E. (2014) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmr.10.0355 · Cited by 829
Platform Performance Investment in the Presence of Network Externalities
Anderson, E. G., Parker, G. G., & Tan, B. (2014) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2013.0505 · Cited by 326
Cited by
Jozani, M., Ayaburi, E., Ko, M., & Choo, K.-K. R. (2020) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2020.106260 · Cited by 303
Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions
Choi, H., Mela, C. F., Balseiro, S. R., & Leary, A. (2020) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2019.0902 · Cited by 181
The personalization–privacy paradox in the attention economy
Cloarec, J. (2020) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120299 · Cited by 112
Gastaldi, L., Appio, F. P., Trabucchi, D., Buganza, T., & Corso, M. (2024) · Information Systems Journal · doi:10.1111/isj.12491 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Gal-Or, E., Gal-Or, R., & Penmetsa, N.
- Venue
- Information Systems Research
- Published
- 2018-09
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 698-722
- ISSN
- 1047-7047 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5536
- OpenAlex
- W2796230370
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 9.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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