The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling Quality by Selling Through a Reputable Retailer: An Example of Renting the Reputation of Another Agent
Abstract
This paper gives an example of renting the reputation of another agent to signal quality. We show that in a “maximally” separating equilibrium, manufacturers of high quality products distribute through retailers with strong reputation (reputable retailers), while manufacturers of low quality products distribute through retailers with no reputation (discounters). In this way, even if high quality manufacturers have no reputation of their own to post as bond, they can signal quality by posting the reputation of the retailers. In equilibrium, reputable retailers never default on their reputation. We also show that it pays the retailers to invest in reputation, as reputable retailers earn profits bounded away from zero under endogenous sequential entry, while the discounters' profits are zero.
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Citations
Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Cited by
No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality
Kirmani, A., & Rao, A. R. (2000) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.64.2.66.18000 · Cited by 2,144
Signaling Unobservable Product Quality through a Brand Ally
Rao, A. R., Qu, L., & Ruekert, R. W. (1999) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/002224379903600209 · Cited by 963
A Systematic Review of the Corporate Reputation Literature: Definition, Measurement, and Theory
Walker, K. (2010) · Corporate Reputation Review · doi:10.1057/crr.2009.26 · Cited by 881
Chung, S., & Cho, H. (2017) · Psychology & Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.21001 · Cited by 809
Wells, J. D., Valacich, J. S., & Hess, T. J. (2011) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/23044048 · Cited by 759
Metadata
- Authors
- Chu, W., & Chu, W.
- Venue
- Marketing Science
- Published
- 1994-05
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 177-189
- ISSN
- 0732-2399 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-548X
- OpenAlex
- W2097899517
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 6.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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