The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality
Abstract
Recent research in information economics has focused on signals as mechanisms to solve problems that arise under asymmetric information. A firm or individual credibly communicates the level of some unobservable element in a transaction by providing an observable signal. When applied to conveying product quality information, this issue is of particular interest to the discipline of marketing. In this article, the authors focus on the ways a firm may signal the unobservable quality of its products through several marketing-mix variables. The authors develop a typology that classifies signals and discuss the available empirical evidence on the signaling properties of several marketing variables. They consider managerial implications of signaling and outline an agenda for future empirical research.
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Citations
Cites
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“There fore, signals are unlikely to convey quality for credence products, whose quality is not discernible even after pur chase and use (Darby and Kami 1973).”
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Cited by
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310388419 · Cited by 6,735
Pavlou, P. A., Liang, H., & Xue, Y. (2007) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25148783 · Cited by 2,646
The price is unfair! A conceptual framework of price fairness perceptions
Xia, L., Monroe, K. B., & Cox, J. L. (2004) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.68.4.1.42733 · Cited by 1,474
Filieri, R. (2015) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.006 · Cited by 1,083
Schlosser, A. E., White, T. B., & Lloyd, S. M. (2006) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.70.2.133 · Cited by 947
Metadata
- Authors
- Kirmani, A., & Rao, A. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Marketing
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2000-04
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 66-79
- ISSN
- 0022-2429 (ISSN-L)
- 1547-7185
- OpenAlex
- W2179200719
- Cited by
- 2,144
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 60.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
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- Kirmani, A., & Rao, A. R. (2000). No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality. Journal of Marketing. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.64.2.66.18000
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
