The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
Abstract
This paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer's cost structure, and of being able to offer more general contracts. We use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios: three increasingly general contracts (wholesale-pricing schemes, two-part linear schemes, and twopart nonlinear schemes), each under full and incomplete information about the buyer's cost structure. We allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both; for the supplier, this is implemented through a cutoff policy. We derive the supplier's optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts. Our key findings are as follows: First, the value of information is higher under two-part contracts; second, the value of offering two-part contracts is higher under full information; and third, the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial.
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Cites
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The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
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Self-citationSupply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information
Cachon, G. P., & Fisher, M. (2000) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1032.12029 · Cited by 1,839
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Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem
Clark, A. J., & Scarf, H. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0265 · Cited by 1,256
Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management
(1999) · International Series in Operations Research & Management Science · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9 · Cited by 1,232
Value of Information in Capacitated Supply Chains
Gavirneni, S., Kapuscinski, R., & Tayur, S. (1999) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.45.1.16 · Cited by 888
Market Segmentation, Self-Selection, and Product Line Design
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Channel Coordination and Quantity Discounts
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Cited by
Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts
Cachon, G. P. (2003) · Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science · doi:10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7 · Cited by 2,683
Perspectives in supply chain risk management
Tang, C. S. (2006) · International Journal of Production Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2005.12.006 · Cited by 2,577
Self-citationSahin, F., & Robinson, E. P. (2002) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.2002.tb01654.x · Cited by 731
Antecedents of supply chain visibility in retail supply chains: A resource‐based theory perspective
Barratt, M., & Oke, A. (2007) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2007.01.003 · Cited by 702
Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach
Gao, L., Wang, X., Xu, Y., & Zhang, Q. (2011) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2011.110415 · Cited by 419
Metadata
- Authors
- Corbett, C. J., Zhou, D., & Tang, C. S.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2004-04
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 550-559
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2093744780
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 40.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.