Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Cited by 233

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives

Casas-Arce, Pablo, Martínez-Jerez, F. Asís · 2009 · Management Science

Abstract

Contests (or tournaments) are pervasive in organizations. They help performance evaluation by eliminating common shocks affecting agents' performance. However, tournaments are less effective when participants have heterogeneous ability because participants may conclude that the ability gap is too large to be overcome by their effort. Our theoretical analysis shows that a similar loss of motivation arises when tournaments take place over multiple periods because interim performance acts in a way that is similar to heterogeneous ability. Analyzing the sales contests organized by a commodities company, we document that winning participants decrease their effort as their lead extends, whereas the effort of trailing participants fades only when the gap to a winning position is very large. We also show that, on average, when contests are introduced they induce a higher level of effort among participants, although the incentives weaken as the number of participants increases. Finally, we demonstrate that although retailers respond to the multiple performance dimensions of the incentive program in part by shifting effort toward sales of more expensive products, they channel most of the increased effort toward reaching more customers.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1021

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 2 references

Cited by

See all 233

Metadata

Authors
Casas-Arce, P., & Martínez-Jerez, F. A.
Venue
Management Science
Published
2009-08
Volume
55
Issue
8
Pages
1306-1320
ISSN
  • 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5501
OpenAlex
W2130491457
Cited by
233
References
2
FWCI
14.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1021
The paper
Casas-Arce, P., & Martínez-Jerez, F. A. (2009). Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1021

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.