The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records
Open accessAbstract
We use a quasi-experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance. The setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where, for exogenous reasons, management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity. We find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long-lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm. Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers' incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others. This paper was accepted by Olav Sorenson, organizations.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A theory of social comparison processes
Festinger, L. (1954) · Human Relations · doi:10.1177/001872675400700202 · Cited by 20,926
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176
Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.254 · Cited by 5,882
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261010 · Cited by 4,560
Happiness: Lessons from a New Science
Cooper, R. N., & Layard, R. (2005) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20031793 · Cited by 4,083
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067 · Cited by 3,186
Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles
Clark, A. E., Frijters, P., & Shields, M. A. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.1.95 · Cited by 3,159
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Cited by
The Dark Side of Competition for Status
Charness, G., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1747 · Cited by 510
“…of relative performance information in tournaments or under piece-rate payment schemes (Hannan et al ., 2008; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010a,b; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2011; Eriksson et al ., 2009, find more nuanced results), the effects of feedback on relative performance in a flat wage…”
Azmat, G., & Iriberri, N. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.001 · Cited by 390
TEAM INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM A FIRM LEVEL EXPERIMENT
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12028 · Cited by 315
The Behavioralist Goes to School: Leveraging Behavioral Economics to Improve Educational Performance
Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., Neckermann, S., & Sadoff, S. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20130358 · Cited by 274
Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment
Bradler, C., Dur, R., Neckermann, S., & Non, A. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2291 · Cited by 268
Gallus, J. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2540 · Cited by 262
Feedback, Self-Esteem, and Performance in Organizations
Kuhnen, C. M., & Tymula, A. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1379 · Cited by 261
Getting rid of performance ratings: Genius or folly? A debate
Adler, S., Campion, M., Colquitt, A., Grubb, A., Murphy, K., Ollander-Krane, R., & Pulakos, E. D. (2016) · Industrial and Organizational Psychology · doi:10.1017/iop.2015.106 · Cited by 230
“Although some research finds ratings improve motivation and performance (see Blanes i Vidal & Nossol, 2009), other research suggests they can hurt both motivation and performance, especially in collaborative work environments and when ratings are tied to differential rewards (see, e.g., Casas-Arce…”
BackgroundRankings and Risk‐Taking in the Finance Industry
KIRCHLER, M., LINDNER, F., & WEITZEL, U. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12701 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanes i Vidal, J., & Nossol, M.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2011-10
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1721-1736
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2118899374
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 23.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.