The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rankings and Risk‐Taking in the Finance Industry
Open accessAbstract
Rankings are omnipresent in the finance industry, yet the literature is silent on how they impact financial professionals' behavior. Using lab‐in‐the‐field experiments with 657 professionals and lab experiments with 432 students, we investigate how rank incentives affect investment decisions. We find that both rank and tournament incentives increase risk‐taking among underperforming professionals, while only tournament incentives affect students. This rank effect is robust to the experimental frame (investment frame vs. abstract frame), to payoff consequences (own return vs. family return), to social identity priming (private identity vs. professional identity), and to professionals' gender (no gender differences among professionals).
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Kirchler, Lindner, and Weitzel (2018) find that rankings increase risk taking of underperforming financial market professionals.
“and Kirchler, Lindner, and Weitzel (2018) find that rankings increase risk taking of underperforming financial market professionals.”
From Copy Trading (2020) · cites this paper as Kirchler, Lindner, and Weitzel (2018)
Citations
Cites
Maslow, A. H. (1943) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0054346 · Cited by 21,563 · cited 1×
“…may be shaped by the business culture of the finance industry, where rankings and relative performance are pervasive features that can potentially improve a professional’s self-image (Maslow (1943), Bénabou and Tirole (2003), Köszegi (2006)) or public status (Frank (1985), Moldovanu et al. (2007)).”
Rammstedt, B., & John, O. P. (2007) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2006.02.001 · Cited by 4,244
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 62
- 10.1257/aer.101.2.695 · DOI
- 10.1007/s11238-011-9282-3 · DOI
- 10.1162/003355300554881 · DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01204.x · DOI
- 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.001 · DOI
- 10.1111/jeea.12028 · DOI
- Bebchuk Lucian, 2010, Regulating bankers' pay, Georgetown Law Journal, 98, 247
- 10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1086/684853 · DOI
- 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1383 · DOI
- 10.1093/rof/rfu021 · DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.x · DOI
- 10.3982/ECTA7139 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.010 · DOI
- 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1747 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.1.206 · DOI
- 10.1038/nature13977 · DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhx003 · DOI
- 10.1257/aer.89.4.781 · DOI
- 10.1006/jeth.1997.2359 · DOI
- 10.1023/A:1026435508449 · DOI
- 10.1086/667996 · DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00676.x · DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.07.003 · DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhm032 · DOI
- Dewatripont Mathias, 2012, The Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory Paradigms, 105
- 10.1257/aer.99.2.606 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.11.010 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01015.x · DOI
- 10.1257/aer.20130683 · DOI
- 10.1093/rof/rft032 · DOI
- 10.1177/001872675400700202 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 · DOI
- Frank Robert H., 1985, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status
- 10.1257/089533005775196732 · DOI · Paper page
- Gächter Simon Eric J.Johnson andAndreasHerrmann 2007 Individual‐level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2007‐02. · DOI
- 10.1111/1540-6261.00581 · DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00737.x · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1007/s10683-005-1465-8 · DOI
- 10.1257/000282802762024700 · DOI
- 10.2307/2391905 · DOI
- 10.1016/S1048-9843(96)90024-7 · DOI
- 10.1007/s10683-015-9445-0 · DOI
- 10.1086/342041 · DOI
- 10.1037/a0019265 · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.11.003 · DOI
- 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1607 · DOI
- 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.02.010 · DOI
- 10.1162/JEEA.2006.4.4.673 · DOI
- 10.1093/qje/qjt035 · DOI
- 10.1007/BF01064046 · DOI
- 10.1073/pnas.0408022101 · DOI
- 10.1073/pnas.0608842104 · DOI
- 10.1086/518010 · DOI
- 10.1162/003355302760193896 · DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2006.00330.x · DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01593.x · DOI
- 10.1111/0022-1082.00066 · DOI
- Starmer Chris, 1991, Does the random‐lottery incentive system elicit true preferences? An experimental investigation, American Economic Review, 81, 971
- 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.004 · DOI
- Veblen Thorstein, 1899, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions
- 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00089-9 · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Apesteguia, J., Oechssler, J., & Weidenholzer, S. (2020) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3508 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- KIRCHLER, M., LINDNER, F., & WEITZEL, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Bergen (NO)
- Max Planck Society (DE)
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2018-07-12
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2271-2302
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3121651152
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 0.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF START‐grant Y617‐G11, SFB F63)
- Radboud Universiteit
- Vetenskapsrådet (2015‐01713)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Keywords
- ranking, tournament incentives, risk-taking, investment decision-making, financial professionals, underperformance, gender differences, framing effects
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review